

 



     

   



ARE THERE AS MANY TRADEMARK OFFICES
AS TRADEMARK EXAMINERS?*
MICHAEL D. FRAKES & MELISSA F. WASSERMAN†
ABSTRACT
Federal trademark-registration rights have grown in import, and
trademark owners have taken notice. In the fiscal year of 2018, over
660,000 federal trademark registration applications were filed with the
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (“Trademark Office”), representing
a 60 percent increase from a decade prior. Yet despite the fact that there
is growing concern that the Trademark Office is routinely issuing
inconsistent trademark determinations, systematic empirical studies of
the administrative process of obtaining federal registration rights are
virtually nonexistent. This Article begins to close this gap by
conducting the first large-scale study of trademark officials, known as
trademark-examining attorneys, who make the initial determination on
whether to accept or decline a federal trademark registration. Utilizing
a novel dataset comprising over 7.8 million trademark applications,
this Article examines the extent to which trademark-examining
attorneys’ determinations differ from one another. We find substantial
heterogeneity in Trademark Office outcomes. Trademark-examining
attorneys have wildly divergent publication rates and registration rates
even while controlling for a range of characteristics of the applications.
The duration of time an application is before the Trademark Office
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also varies considerably among trademark-examining attorneys as
does whether a filed opposition is sustained.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ...........................................................................................1808
I. Background .......................................................................................1813
A. The Goals of Trademark Law and the Significance of
Trademark Registration.....................................................1813
B. The Registration Process ...................................................1817
C. Concerns with Heterogeneity in Decision-making .........1820
II. Data and Methodology ..................................................................1824
A. Data and Outcomes ............................................................1824
B. Methodology: Summary Statistics on Spread in Outcomes
Across Examining Attorneys ............................................1825
C. Methodology: Graphical Analysis ....................................1827
D. Methodology: Statistical Inference ...................................1829
III. Results ............................................................................................1831
A. Publication-Rate Analysis .................................................1831
B. Analysis of Publication Rates on First Substantive
Decisions ..............................................................................1838
C. Registration-Rate Analysis ...............................................1842
D. Sustained-Opposition-Rate Analysis ...............................1844
E. Application-Duration Analysis .........................................1848
IV. Implications and Discussion.........................................................1851
Conclusion .............................................................................................1853

INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (the
“Trademark Office” or “Agency”) has managed to jostle its way from
the legal periphery into the mainstream. For example, the Agency
made national headlines in 2014 when it canceled the Washington
Redskins’ federal registration of the REDSKINS trademark, finding
that the term was disparaging to a considerable composite of Native
Americans.1 The Trademark Office continued to gain traction in 2015,
1. Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080, 1082 (T.T.A.B. 2014); see
Ken Belson & Edward Wyatt, Redskins Lose Ruling on Trademarks, but Fight Isn’t Over, N.Y.
TIMES (June 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/19/sports/football/us-patent-officecancels-redskins-trademark-registration.html [https://perma.cc/Y4GU-Z9JL]; Jacob Gershman,
Ashby Jones & Kevin Clark, U.S. Patent Office Cancels Washington Redskins Trademarks, WALL
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when the Supreme Court substantially elevated the impact of the
Trademark Office’s determination to uphold or deny federal
registration of a mark by holding that the Agency’s decision could have
preclusive effect on a later infringement action involving the same
mark.2 In that same year, the significance of the Trademark Office’s
decisions was further enhanced by federal courts suggesting that the
denial of federal registration to a mark forecloses the possibility of
pursuing a federal unfair competition claim under the Lanham Act—
meaning only state law protection would remain.3 Finally, in 2017 and
2019, the Agency made more headlines when the Supreme Court held
that the Trademark Office’s application of the ban on registering
disparaging marks and scandalous or immoral marks was
unconstitutional.4
The growing import of federal registration of trademarks has not
been lost on trademark owners. As of the end of the 2018 fiscal year,
there were a staggering 2.4 million active federal trademark
registrations in the United States.5 During that same year, 660,000

ST. J. (June 14, 2014, 8:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-patent-office-cancelswashington-redskins-trademarks-1403103213 [https://perma.cc/ZK99-7G5Z]; Theresa Vargas,
U.S. Patent Office Cancels Redskins Trademark Registration, Says Name Is Disparaging, WASH.
POST (June 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/us-patent-office-cancels-redskinstrademark-registration-says-name-is-disparaging/2014/06/18/e7737bb8-f6ee-11e3-8aa9dad2ec03978
9_story.html [https://perma.cc/G5HK-AD84]. The decision actually canceled six Redskins
registrations associated with football services that were filed from 1967 to 1990. Blackhorse, 111
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082–84. The Blackhorse decision was rendered moot by the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
2. See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 160 (2015).
3. See infra note 11.
4. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019) (holding that the Lanham Act’s
provision prohibiting the registration of immoral or scandalous trademarks violated the First
Amendment); Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1751 (same); Sarah Jeong, Should We Be Able to Reclaim a
Racist Insult—as a Registered Trademark?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/17/magazine/should-we-be-able-to-reclaim-a-racist-insult-as-aregistered-trademark.html [https://perma.cc/4HMZ-H77W]; Adam Liptak, Supreme Court
Strikes Down Law Barring Vulgar Trademarks, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/24/us/politics/supreme-court-vulgar-trademarks-foia.html
[https://perma.cc/L2PZ-78LG]; Diana Michele Yap, He Named His Band the Slants to Reclaim a
Slur. Not Everyone Approved., WASH. POST (May 16, 2019, 9:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/books/he-named-his-band-the-slants-to-reclaim
-a-slur-not-everyone-approved/2019/05/15/b939275a-700d-11e9-8be0-ca575670e91c_story.html
[https://perma.cc/RA8M-E84T].
5. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2019 PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 181 tbl.15 [hereinafter 2019 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT] (noting that there were 2,415,550 active certificates of registration for trademarks in
2018).
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federal registration applications were filed with the Trademark
Office—a 60 percent increase from a decade prior.6 Yet despite the
increasing significance of federal registration rights, there is growing
concern that the Agency is routinely issuing inconsistent trademark
determinations. Consider, for example, the recent controversy
associated with the Trademark Office’s review of the mark “The
Vegan Butcher.”7 The Agency refused Herbivorous Butcher’s
trademark-registration application for the mark “The Vegan Butcher”
for meat substitutes on the grounds it was merely descriptive.8 Shortly
thereafter, a different trademark official at the Trademark Office
approved Sweet Earth Foods’s federal registration application for the
same mark for the same goods.9 Examples like this suggest that the
Trademark Office’s decision to grant a federal trademark registration
is driven not only by the merits of the application but also by the
proclivities of the trademark official to whom the application is
randomly assigned.
Despite anecdotal evidence that trademark-registration
requirements are being inconsistently applied across trademark
officials, systematic empirical studies of the administrative process
behind obtaining federal registration rights are virtually nonexistent.10
This Article begins to close this gap in the literature by conducting the
first large-scale study of trademark officials, known as trademarkexamining attorneys, who make the initial determination on whether
to accept or decline a federal trademark registration.
6. See id. (noting that the Trademark Office registered 367,382 trademark applications and
273,808 applications were abandoned); id. at 182 tbl.16 (stating that the Trademark Office
received 401,392 trademark registration applications in 2008 and 638,847 trademark registration
applications in 2018).
7. See Jelisa Castrodale, America’s First ‘Vegan Butcher’ Is Fighting Nestle Over the Term’s
Trademark, VICE (Dec. 3, 2019, 6:07 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/7x5g3a/americasfirst-vegan-butcher-is-fighting-nestle-over-the-terms-trademark [https://perma.cc/58SU-YESJ];
Mark Reilly, Feds Told Herbivorous Butcher ‘No’ on Trademark, but Gave It to Nestlé,
MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL BUS. J. (Nov. 18, 2019, 8:19 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/
twincities/news/2019/11/18/feds-told-herbivorous-butcher-no-on-trademark-but.html [https://perma.cc/
P5EU-LD88].
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Stuart J.H. Graham, Galen Hancock, Alan C. Marco & Amanda Fila Myers, The
USPTO Trademark Case Files Dataset: Descriptions, Lessons, and Insights, 22 J. ECON. & MGMT.
STRATEGY 669, 671 (2013) (noting that empirical “studies using U.S. administrative [trademark]
data remain scarce”). In fact, trademark literature more generally has tended to ignore the role
of trademark registration. See Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in
Modern American Trademark Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867, 870–71 (2017) (“Foundational
critiques of modern trademark law tend not to address the role of registration.”).
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Utilizing a novel dataset comprising over 7.8 million trademark
applications, this Article examines the extent to which trademarkexamining attorneys’ determinations differ from one another. We find
substantial heterogeneity in Trademark Office outcomes. Namely,
trademark-examining attorneys have wildly divergent publication rates
and registration rates even while controlling for a range of application
characteristics.11 Moreover, the duration of time an application is
before the Trademark Office also varies considerably among
trademark-examining attorneys as does whether a filed opposition is
sustained.
The above results are concerning for several reasons. To begin,
the fact that there are substantially divergent registration rates among
trademark-examining attorneys is highly suggestive that the
Trademark Office is regularly getting the decision to grant or deny
registration wrong. The trademark-registration standards are set to
generally track the economic justifications for trademarks, which are
to decrease consumer search costs without overly restricting certain
marketplace competition while securing for the mark’s owner the
goodwill of her business.12 As a result, if trademark-examining
attorneys are routinely denying registrations on valid marks, then the
Trademark Office is depriving the most worthy applications of the
substantial expansion in rights associated with federal registration.
Alternatively, if trademark-examining attorneys are registering
invalid trademarks, these trademarks may impose the costs of
additional federal registration rights on society without producing any
of the benefits. Moreover, because trademark-registration
determinations can become “incontestable,” which limits the grounds
upon which the mark’s validity may be challenged in trademarkinfringement litigation, the application of the trademark-registration

11. There is some disagreement as to whether a mark that is denied federal registration can
be enforced as an unregistered mark under § 43(a), the unfair competition claim section of the
Lanham Act. Recently, a district court decision held that marks barred from registration could
not be enforced under § 43(a). See Renna v. County of Union, 88 F. Supp. 3d 310, 321 (D.N.J.
2014). And at least one Federal Circuit judge has also taken this position. See In re Tam, 785 F.3d
567, 576 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., concurring) (“Equally clear, however, is that § 43(a)
protection is only available for unregistered trademarks that could have qualified for federal
registration.”). Nevertheless, several trademark scholars suggest otherwise. See, e.g., Mark P.
McKenna, The Implications of Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., PATENTLY-O (June 19, 2014),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/06/implications-blackhorse-football.html [http://perma.cc/
N6LY-QZCR].
12. See Melissa F. Wasserman, What Administrative Law Can Teach the Trademark System,
93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1511, 1520–21 (2016).
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requirements matter beyond the mere grant of additional registration
rights.13 Thus, if the Trademark Office incorrectly granted the federal
trademark application on “The Vegan Butcher” because the mark
merely describes meat substitutes, then Sweet Earth Foods would be
able to unfairly burden new entrants’ ability to communicate with
consumers in the marketplace.14
Irrespective of concerns with the quality of examination,
inconsistent Trademark Office decisions also raise issues about equity.
The dominant theories of administrative justice, such as Professor
Jerry Mashaw’s theory of “bureaucratic rationality,” hold that
uniformity in agency outcomes is an important goal.15 This concern is
also implicated in the “The Vegan Butcher” example, as the attorney
for Herbivorous Butcher was quick to point out “[i]f it’s merely
descriptive for us, then it should be merely descriptive for [Sweet Earth
Foods].”16 Finally, to the extent that trademark-registration decisions
are being driven by the idiosyncratic views of the trademark-examining
attorney reviewing the application, rendering the registration of
trademarks arbitrary or unpredictable, then First Amendment
concerns may also be implicated.17
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. Part I
introduces the implications of federal registration of trademarks, the
administrative process associated with trademark registration, and the
harms associated with inconsistent Trademark Office outcomes. Part
II describes our data set and methodology utilized. Part III presents
the results of our empirical analysis. Finally, Part IV begins to explore
the implications of our results.

13. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5)–(6) (2018).
14. As discussed in Part II, the exclusive rights associated with a mark that otherwise
qualifies for protection originate from the use of the mark in commerce, not its federal
registration. Thus, Sweet Earth Foods should not be able to prevent Herbivorous Butcher from
continuing to use the mark in Minneapolis but Nestlé could, for example, hamper Herbivorous
Butcher’s ability to use the mark if Herbivorous Butcher expanded into other geographical
markets.
15. JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY CLAIMS 25–26 (1983); Robert A. Kagan, Inside Administrative Law, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 816, 820 (1984) (reviewing JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983)).
16. Castrodale, supra note 7.
17. See Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Immoral or Scandalous Marks: An Empirical
Analysis, 8 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 169, 197–203 (2019).
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I. BACKGROUND
This Part begins by outlining the goals of trademark law and the
rights that flow from federal registration of a trademark. It then
provides an overview of the federal registration process and describes
the harms associated with inconsistent Trademark Office outcomes.
A. The Goals of Trademark Law and the Significance of Trademark
Registration
A trademark is a word, phrase, symbol, design, or combination
thereof that identifies and distinguishes goods and services of one party
from those of another.18 For instance, trademark protection enables
consumers who are shopping for sparkling water to rely on the
presence of the TOPO CHICO mark as an indicator of the sparkling
water’s quality to which that mark is affixed. Consumers who
previously had a good experience with TOPO CHICO sparkling water
can simply look for the TOPO CHICO mark the next time they go
shopping for sparkling water or order a sparkling water in a restaurant.
First-time customers can rely on the TOPO CHICO mark as shorthand
for information they have learned from advertising or by word of
mouth.
Marks serve this search-cost reduction function only to the extent
the trademark owner can stop others from using the same mark on
confusingly similar products. For example, if another company could
label its sparkling water TOPO CHICO, consumers would no longer
be able to rely on the TOPO CHICO mark to indicate a quality signal.
As a result, consumers would have to rely upon alternative,
presumably more costly, mechanisms to verify the attributes of the
product. Moreover, because trademark law “helps assure a producer
that it—and not an imitating competitor—will reap the financial,
reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product,”19 the
producer of TOPO CHICO sparkling water has an incentive to
produce goods of a consistent quality.20
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Technically, a trademark is a word, phrase, symbol, and/or design
that identifies and distinguishes the source of the good of one party from those of others. A service
mark is a word, phrase, symbol, and/or design that identifies and distinguishes the source of a
service rather than goods. We utilize the term trademark in this Article to refer to both
trademarks and service marks.
19. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1994).
20. See Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099,
2108 (2004) (“[I]f consumers lacked the ability to distinguish one brand from another, firms would
have no reason to create brands with more costly but higher quality characteristics.”).
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This example helps illustrate the standard justifications of
trademark law: to reduce the costs to a consumer of searching for goods
that satisfy her preferences without overly restricting marketplace
competition, and to create incentives to preserve and improve product
quality by enhancing the communication of quality-related
information to consumers.21 These justifications for trademark law
have been endorsed by the Supreme Court22 and have had an
enormous influence in the shaping of trademark scholarship.23
The U.S. trademark system is often referred to as a “use-based”
rather than a “registration-based” system.24 In other words, the

21. The vast majority of scholars use the rhetoric of search costs to describe the normative
goals of trademark law. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 167 & n.2 (2003) (summarizing consumersearch-costs literature); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting
Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1223 (2007) (noting that “the search
costs theory of trademark law has attracted a substantial following among both commentators
and courts”); Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98
VA. L. REV. 67, 75 (2012) (stating that an “overwhelming majority of scholars use search costs
language to describe trademark law’s purposes”). Furthermore, the Supreme Court jurisprudence
recognized that trademark law’s core theoretical justification is to reduce consumer search costs:
[T]rademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark,
“reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,” for it
quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item—the item with this
mark—is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she
liked (or disliked) in the past.
Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163–64 (citation omitted) (quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.01[2], at 2–3 (3d ed. 1994)).
Although the dominant theoretical account of trademark law is rooted in economics,
scholars have posited other justifications for trademark protection. For instance, Barton Beebe
has argued a “semiotic” account of trademark law that considers consumers’ demand for “signs,
distinctions, [and] differences.” Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51
UCLA L. REV. 621, 704 (2004). Robert Bone has argued that moral arguments such as intentional
deception should be treated differently than economic concerns. Robert G. Bone, Taking the
Confusion out of “Likelihood of Confusion”: Toward a More Sensible Approach to Trademark
Infringement, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1307, 1350–53 (2012). Others have argued that additional
values, such as the First Amendment, should play a larger role in the development of trademark
jurisprudence. See Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61
SMU L. REV. 381, 447–57 (2008) (arguing that trademark law should be subject to more First
Amendment scrutiny); Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58
S.C. L. REV. 737, 756 (2007) (noting that while she is “largely in favor of core trademark
infringement doctrine as it stands now,” she nevertheless believes that trademark law should be
treated more consistently with other commercial speech for First Amendment purposes).
22. See, e.g., Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163–64.
23. See supra note 21.
24. Registration-based trademark systems are more common than use-based systems. See,
e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, (National) Trademark Laws and the (Non-National) Domain Name
System, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 495, 496 (2000) (“[F]or over a century the United States has
steadfastly resisted adoption of a registration-based system of trademark priority and has adhered
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exclusive rights associated with a mark that otherwise qualifies for
protection originate from the use of the mark in commerce, not its
federal registration.25 Federal registration of a mark with the
Trademark Office is not required for a trademark to become protected.
Moreover, the Lanham Act, the source of federal trademark law, fails
to protect a trademark registrant’s exclusive rights in its mark once the
mark is no longer being used in commerce and there is no intent to
resume such use.26
Nevertheless, even in the American use-based system, federal
registration of a mark confers a number of important legal rights and
benefits on the registering party that substantially enhances the rights
of trademark owners established by mere common law use.27 For one,
registration provides the trademark registrant with a “right of priority,
nationwide in effect,” against anyone else in the nation who uses the
registered mark after the date of application.28 This right of priority
extends nationally even if the registrant has not itself used the mark
throughout the nation. In contrast, exclusive rights in an unregistered

instead to a use-based philosophy.”). Although trademarks are governed by both state and federal
law, the Lanham Act, the source of federal trademark law, dominates. See, e.g., The United States
Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission Report and Recommendations to USTA
President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 377 (1987) (“Federal trademark
registration, Section 43(a), and the engulfing sweep of interstate commerce have given the law
and policy of trademarks a strongly federal cast. The federal courts now decide, under federal
law, all but a few trademark disputes. State trademark law and state courts are less influential
than ever.”); Lee Ann W. Lockridge, Abolishing State Trademark Registrations, 29 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 597, 604–05 (2011) (summarizing the dominance of federal law in the shaping
of trademark rights). For a persuasive argument that state law has played less of a role in the
development of trademark law than generally believed, see generally Mark P. McKenna,
Trademark Law’s Faux Federalism, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 288,
288 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2015).
25. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (“At common law the exclusive right to [a
trademark] grows out of its use, and not its mere adoption.”); Sengoku Works Ltd. v. RMC Int’l,
Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1996) (“To acquire ownership of a trademark it is not enough
to have invented the mark first or even to have registered it first; the party claiming ownership
must have been the first to actually use the mark in the sale of goods or services.”).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d) (2018) (requiring an applicant to submit a statement that the mark
is being used in commerce); id. § 1127 (“A mark shall be deemed to be ‘abandoned’ if . . . its use
has been discontinued with intent not to resume such use.”).
27. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 575 U.S. 138, 142 (2015) (“The Lanham Act
confers ‘important legal rights and benefits’ on trademark owners who register their marks.”
(quoting 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 19:3, at 19–21 (4th ed. 2014))); see Alexandra J. Roberts, Trademark Failure to Function, 104
IOWA L. REV. 1977, 1985 (2019) [hereinafter Roberts, Trademark Failure to Function] (“And
despite the dearth of discussion about it, registration matters.”).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c).
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mark extend only to the geographic regions in which the mark is being
used.29
Additionally, once a mark has been registered for five years, it can
become “incontestable,” which limits the grounds upon which the
mark’s validity may be challenged.30 This advantage is especially
significant for “descriptive” marks, or marks that “immediately
convey[] information concerning a quality or characteristic of the
product or service.”31 Marks that are descriptive must show “secondary
meaning” as a designation of source for that product; that is, they must
demonstrate that consumers do not think of the mark as merely
describing the product but instead identify the mark with the product
to receive trademark protection in the United States.32 Incontestability
prevents courts from revisiting whether a mark is descriptive, even
when the evidence suggests the mark never developed a secondary
meaning.33
Another substantive advantage that flows from registration is the
ability to obtain the assistance of U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(“CBP”) in restricting the importation of infringing or counterfeit
goods.34 After a markholder applies to record its registered mark with
the CBP, CBP officers access the recording data to prevent the
importation of goods bearing the infringing marks.35 This protection
substantially enhances a markholder’s ability to block infringing
merchandise from entering the country in the first place.
Registration also furnishes a number of procedural advantages.
For instance, registration provides prima facie evidence of the validity
of the mark, the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and the registrant’s
exclusive right to use the mark in U.S. commerce in connection with

29. See Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. Fire Eagle Engine Co., 332 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2003)
(“[T]he owner of common-law trademark rights in an unregistered mark is not entitled to
injunctive relief in those localities where it has failed to establish actual use of the mark.”).
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115(b).
31. In re MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 340 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
32. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162–63 (1995).
33. See, e.g., Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 718 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 1983)
(“We conclude that Park ’N Fly’s mark used in the context of airport parking is, at best, a merely
descriptive mark . . . . [It] would not be entitled to continued registration but for its incontestable
status . . . .”), rev’d, 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 1124; 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (2018).
35. Help CBP Protect Intellectual Property Rights, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION
(July 19, 2019), https://www.cbp.gov/trade/priority-issues/ipr/protection [https://perma.cc/7MG7J9C2].
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the goods and services listed in the certificate.36 Federal registration
also enables a markholder to sue in federal court to enforce her
trademark.37 Finally, registration enhances damages, as only registered
marks can take advantage of counterfeiting provisions that award
automatic treble damages upon a showing of intentional and knowing
use of a counterfeit mark.38 Taken together, these benefits are so
significant that it is now commonplace for owners seeking protection
of trademark rights to file for federal registration rather than rely solely
on the use-based system.39
B. The Registration Process
To obtain federal registration of a trademark on the principal
register, the mark’s owner must file an application with the Trademark
Office, which is an agency housed in the Department of Commerce.40
The application must include, among other things, a depiction of the
mark and a list of the goods or services for which protection is sought.41
The applicant must also specify the statutory “basis” for its application,
of which the two most common are current use of the mark in
commerce and a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce.42
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b).
37. Id. § 1121.
38. Id. § 1117(b). A court can decline to award treble damages when it finds extenuating
circumstances. Id.
39. Lee Ann W. Lockridge, Abolishing State Trademark Registrations, 29 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 597, 605 (2011) (“[F]ederal registration [is] indispensable for any owner making an
informed decision about its trademark rights.”). In addition, some scholars have argued that
registration also can enable owners to assert more tenuous claims—that is, bully—competitors
and new entrants who lack the financial resources to litigate. See, e.g., Roberts, Trademark Failure
to Function, supra note 27, at 1985.
40. The Lanham Act establishes two separate registers, principal and supplemental, for
federal trademark registrations. Trademarks and service marks that identify the goods or services
of one manufacturer and distinguish them from another—that is, are distinctive—are eligible for
registration on the principal register. 15 U.S.C. § 1051; see also id. §§ 1051–72. In contrast,
designations that do not perform this function but are instead merely descriptive, deceptively
misdescriptive, primarily geographically descriptive, or product configurations that lack acquired
distinctiveness, among other things, may be registered on the supplemental register. Id. § 1091(a).
The principal-register registrations enjoy a number of substantive and procedural advantages that
do not accrue to the supplemental-register registrations.
41. 37 C.F.R.§ 2.21(a) (2019) (listing the basic requirements of an application to obtain a
filing date as (a) the legal name of the applicant; (b) a name and address for correspondence; (c)
a depiction of the mark; (d) a list of the goods and services for which protection is sought; and (e)
the filing fee for at least one class of goods and services).
42. Although the intent-to-use applications are relatively new, originating in 1989, they
comprise, on average, the majority of new filings at the Trademark Office each year. Graham et
al., supra note 10, at 15–16.
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Upon receipt of the application, the Trademark Office randomly
assigns the application to a trademark-examining attorney.43 The
attorney then conducts an ex parte examination to determine whether
the mark meets the federal registration requirements. These
requirements incorporate the basic doctrinal principles that govern the
validity of a trademark, including conditions that the mark must
possess either inherent or acquired distinctiveness of source, not be
confusingly similar to some previously used or registered mark, and not
be deceptive without secondary meaning.44 If the trademark-examining
attorney finds grounds for refusing registration, she will issue an “office
action” informing the applicant of the reasons why the registration is
denied.45 The applicant can then argue the examiner is incorrect or
amend the application to attempt to moot the grounds for refusal.46
This process may occur several times until the examiner either
approves the application for publication in the Trademark Office’s
Official Gazette or finally refuses to register the mark. An aggrieved
applicant can appeal the denial of registration to the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board (“TTAB”), an administrative tribunal within the
Trademark Office composed primarily of administrative trademark
judges.47
If the trademark-examining attorney determines that the mark
appears registrable, the Trademark Office will publish the application
in the Trademark Office’s Official Gazette for opposition. The thirtyday opposition period is the first opportunity for a third party to
challenge the validity of the registration by initiating an administrative
“opposition” proceeding before the TTAB.48 The opposition
43. Id. at 18. Prior to November 3, 2002, applications were assigned to one of seventeen law
offices in the Trademark Office based on the goods and services claimed in the application. The
applications, however, were still randomly assigned to a trademark-examining attorney within the
law office of interest. Id.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (a)–(f).
45. 37 C.F.R. § 2.21(5)(b).
46. Id. § 2.63(a).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1070. Technically, the TTAB is composed of at least three of the Director,
Deputy Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the Commissioner for
Patents, the Commissioner for Trademarks, and administrative trademark judges who are
appointed by the Secretary of Commerce in consultation with the Director. Id. § 1067(b). The
process by which the Board reviews trademark denials is more formal than the process by which
the Trademark Office makes the initial registration decisions. However, the process by which the
Board reviews trademark denials does not rise to the level of APA required formal adjudication.
See Wasserman, supra note 12, at 1524.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a). Oppositions must be filed within thirty days of the publication of the
trademark. Id.
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proceedings before the TTAB are more formal than both the initial
registration decision by the trademark-examining attorney and
trademark-denial proceedings in that the opposition proceedings are
designed to roughly approximate civil actions in federal court.49 If no
oppositions are filed or the applicant successfully overcomes an
opposition, the use-based applications proceed directly to registration.
With respect to intent-to-use applications, the Trademark Office will
issue a notice of allowance, which states that the applicant must file a
satisfactory statement of use of the mark before the Trademark Office
will register the mark.50
Finally, after the opposition period has expired and the Agency
has issued the registration, a third party may still attack the trademark
grant by initiating an administrative proceeding before the TTAB to
cancel the registration.51 For five years after the initial grant of
registration, the grounds for canceling a mark are the same as opposing
a mark. A third party may oppose the registration of a mark for any
substantive ground a trademark-examining attorney must consider
when making the initial registration decision, plus two additional
substantive grounds: dilution by tarnishment and dilution by blurring.52
After this five-year period, the substantive grounds upon which a third
party can cancel a registration narrow considerably, rendering the
mark “incontestable.”53
Aggrieved parties can appeal adjudications of trademarkregistration grants or denials by the TTAB to the Federal Circuit on
the record generated in Trademark Office proceedings or challenge the
TTAB’s decision in a civil action in federal district court, where
additional discovery may be taken and new evidence submitted.54 Once
49. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 575 U.S. 138, 143 (2015) (describing “[o]pposition
proceedings before the TTAB” as “similar to a civil action in a federal district court” (quoting
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL
BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE § 102.03 (2014))). See Wasserman, supra note 12, at 1525
(discussing the formality associated with TTAB opposition proceedings).
50. 37 C.F.R. § 2.81(b). The applicant has six months from the date of notice of allowance to
file a statement of use, although this period can be extended to up to thirty months for good cause.
15 U.S.C. § 1051(d).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1064.
52. See id. §§ 1064(1)–(3), 1065, 1067–68.
53. Id. § 1065. For more background on incontestability in trademark law, see generally
Rebecca Tushnet, Fixing Incontestability: The Next Frontier?, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 434
(2017).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1071. The appeal to the Federal Circuit is limited to the issues raised and the
record established before the Board. Id. § 1071(a)(4). The appeal to the district court is by way of
civil action and is a de novo proceeding. Id. § 1071(b)(1).
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a party appeals a TTAB decision to a federal district court, the Federal
Circuit’s jurisdiction is divested.55 Subsequent appeals of district court
decisions are to be taken to the regional circuits.56
C. Concerns with Heterogeneity in Decision-Making
The Trademark Office employs approximately seven hundred
trademark-examining attorneys who make over half a million
trademark-registration determinations each year.57 However, several
of the requirements for federal registration, which parallel the validity
doctrines of trademarks,58 contain broad or vague standards. Like
many agencies, the Trademark Office seeks to cabin the discretion of
trademark-examining attorneys by promulgating manuals that provide
detailed rules on how trademark examination should proceed.59 But
these guidelines are a constant struggle between generality and
precision, granting trademark-examining attorneys ample latitude to
determine whether a trademark meets the federal registration
requirements.
For example, trademark-examining attorneys reject trademark
registrations most frequently when there is a likelihood that the mark
is confusingly similar to another mark.60 This doctrine involves a

55. See, e.g., Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Deference to United States Patent and Trademark Office
Determinations by Federal District Courts and the Regional Circuit Courts of Appeals, 87
TRADEMARK REP. 1 (1997); Hope Hamilton, Note, Parsing the Standard of Review Puzzle: How
Much Deference Should Federal District Courts Afford Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
Decisions?, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 489 (2003).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1121; see also Williams v. Dep’t of the Army, 715 F.2d 1485, 1490 n.5 (Fed.
Cir. 1983). Despite having two different routes to appeal TTAB decisions, aggrieved parties
historically have overwhelmingly favored appeal to the Federal Circuit over pursuing civil action.
See Wasserman, supra note 12, at 1526.
57. 2019 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 12 & tbl.15
(noting that in the fiscal year of 2019 the Trademark Office employed 701 trademark-examining
attorneys and processed more than 670,000 trademark applications).
58. Wasserman, supra note 12, at 1520 (“The Trademark Office may reject a registration on
any number of procedural and substantive grounds, the latter of which incorporate the basic
doctrinal principles that govern the validity of a trademark.”).
59. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (2018), https://tmep.uspto.gov/RDMS/TMEP/current [https://perma.cc/YNL3LRZE].
60. Graham et al., supra note 10, at 18 (“The most common ground for refusing registration
is the existence of a ‘likelihood of confusion’ between the applicant’s mark and the mark in an
existing registration.”). The Trademark Act states that a mark cannot be registered if it “so
resembles [an existing] mark . . . as to be likely . . . to cause confusion . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
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thirteen-factor test61 that has been described by Professor Bob Bone as
“deeply flawed . . . open-ended and relatively subjective.”62 Although
Trademark Office guidance dictates that two of the thirteen factors
carry the most weight, the Trademark Office also states “there is no
mechanical test for determining likelihood of confusion and ‘each case
must be decided on its own facts.’”63 Given this broad, case-by-case
decision-making process, it seems highly probable that there is
significant heterogeneity in trademark examiners’ determinations.
To our knowledge, the only study to date that empirically
examines the heterogeneity of trademark-examining attorneys’
determinations is the work of Professors Robert Barton Beebe and
Jeanne C. Fromer.64 Their important study examined 1,901 marks that
the Agency had refused to register on the basis of the prohibition on
scandalous or immoral marks.65 They found that in 114 cases the
Agency “stated that the mark was immoral or scandalous and thus

61. In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973), established a
thirteen-factor test for determining the likelihood of confusion:
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance,
sound, connotation and commercial impression.
(2) The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an
application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in use.
(3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels.
(4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e. ‘impulse’ vs.
careful, sophisticated purchasing.
(5) The fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use).
(6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.
(7) The nature and extent of any actual confusion.
(8) The length of time during and conditions under which there has been concurrent
use without evidence of actual confusion.
(9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark, ‘family’ mark,
product mark).
(10) The market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior mark. . . .
(11) The extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its mark on
its goods.
(12) The extent of potential confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or substantial.
(13) Any other established fact probative of the effect of use.
Id. at 1361.
62. Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion Out of “Likelihood of Confusion”: Toward a
More Sensible Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1307, 1308 (2012).
63. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 1207.01 LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION (2018), https://tmep.uspto.gov/RDMS/
TMEP/current [https://perma.cc/P6QK-S7ZT] (quoting In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476
F.2d at 1361).
64. See generally Beebe & Fromer, supra note 17 (discussing the ways the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office has applied the immoral or scandalous prohibition).
65. Id. at 171–72.
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could not be registered—and that the [Agency] had already registered
a highly similar mark on highly similar goods or services.”66 One of
these cases included the Trademark Office’s refusal to register the
mark FUK!T in connection with apparel on the basis that the appliedfor mark was immoral or scandalous and confusingly similar to the
recently registered—and seemingly equally scandalous—apparel mark
PHUKIT.67 This led Professors Beebe and Fromer to conclude that
Trademark Office is, by its own admission, “making a large number of
inconsistent applications of the § 2(a) prohibition on the registration of
immoral-or-scandalous marks—and often just a short time apart.”68
A Trademark Office that treats similar applications in dissimilar
ways is problematic for several reasons. To begin, the existence of
interexaminer disparity itself demonstrates how much discretionary
authority trademark-examining attorneys wield and instills little
confidence that they are exercising this discretion to apply trademarkregistration standards in a guided and regimented manner. In other
words, inconsistent behavior across examiners leaves observers
wondering whether examiners are systematically “missing the mark”
in making registration determinations.
The trademark-registration standards are set to generally parallel
the economic justifications for trademarks—that is, enabling the public
to easily identify a particular product from a specific source without
unduly restricting orderly competition.69 As a result, if trademarkexamining attorneys are routinely denying registrations on valid
trademarks, then the Trademark Office would be depriving those
applications that may be the most worthy of the substantial rights
associated with federal registration. If firms are allowed to free ride off
the goodwill of other firms, then trademark owners’ incentives to
preserve and improve product quality may be diminished.
Alternatively, if trademark-examining attorneys are allowing
invalid trademarks to be registered, these trademarks may impose the
costs of additional federal registration rights on society without
producing any of the associated benefits. Moreover, once a mark has
been registered for five years it can become incontestable, limiting the
grounds on which a court can invalidate the mark during infringement

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 183, 188.
Id. at 183.
Id.
See Wasserman, supra note 12, at 1520–23.
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litigation.70 Thus, the Trademark Office registration decisions not only
impact whether federal rights can be obtained but also can affect
whether a mark is held valid in a trademark-infringement lawsuit.71
Beyond concerns regarding the quality of examination,
interexaminer disparity may erode confidence in the Trademark Office
by creating the appearance of unfairness and arbitrariness.72
Inconsistent trademark-registration decisions also offend theories of
administrative justice while raising questions of equity.73 Simply put,
the likelihood that a mark is granted federal registration should not be
a function of which trademark-examining attorney the application is
randomly assigned to; instead registration should hinge on the merits
of the application.
Despite the concerns with interexaminer disparity, empirical
examination of the trademark system—especially the administrative
process by which federal trademark registrations are obtained—is
exceedingly rare.74 As noted above, the work of Professors Beebe and
Fromer is one of the few, if only, studies that has examined
heterogeneity in trademark-examining-attorney decision-making.
Although their work is an important contribution to the literature, they
focused on only one basis of refusal—scandalous or immoral
prohibition—and as a result examined less than 1 percent of
trademark-registration determinations.75 Moreover, by focusing on
refusals, their analysis only concentrated on inconsistency in one
particular category of Trademark Office outcomes and decisions. This
Article begins to fill this gap in the literature and provides a more
complete sense of the degree of inconsistency in decision-making at the
Trademark Office by using data from over 7.8 million trademark
applications and conducting the first large-scale, systematic
investigation of a range of decisions made by—and outcomes reached
by—trademark-examining attorneys.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.
See Roberts, Trademark Failure to Function, supra note 27, at 1985.
See MASHAW, supra note 15, at 73.
Id. at 25–26; see also Kagan, supra note 15, at 820 (reviewing JERRY L. MASHAW,
BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983) and
detailing how his “bureaucratic rationality” is a model of agency adjudication that facilitates
“[g]reater control and consistency” by placing “the overriding value” on “accurate, efficient and
consistent implementation of centrally-formulated policies”).
74. Graham et al., supra note 10, at 3.
75. Professors Beebe and Fromer note that only 1,901 marks out of 3.6 million registrations
were refused on the grounds of scandalous or immoral prohibition. Beebe & Fromer, supra note
17, at 171–72.
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II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Data and Outcomes
To demonstrate and evaluate the degree of heterogeneity in
behavior across trademark-examining attorneys, we collected rich data
on individual trademark applications from 1982 to the present from the
Trademark Case Files Dataset made available by the Trademark
Office’s Office of the Chief Economist.76 These data provide
information on (1) the name of the examining attorney randomly
assigned to the application; (2) a range of characteristics of these
applications—for example, whether the application is an intent-to-use
application; whether the application is a trademark, service mark,
collective mark, etc.;77 and (3) various outcomes associated with the
application—for example whether the application was published,
whether an opposition to the publication was sustained, etc.78 Over this
sample period, these data provide information on the reviews of 1,308
trademark-examining attorneys, who, on average, review over 6,000
applications over their careers. In total, our database comprises over
7.8 million trademark applications.
Using these data, our key empirical exercise is to observe how
certain Trademark Office outcomes vary across the different
examining attorneys to which the applications are randomly assigned.
As such, we have analyzed the reviews completed by the different
examiners at the office and documented variation in the following
outcomes:
1. The likelihood that the application is published;

76. A description of this dataset is provided by Stuart Graham, Galen Hancock, Alan Marco,
and Amanda Myers. Graham et al., supra note 10. Though some data on applications from years
prior to 1982 are made available with this dataset, we focus on data in the post-1982 era given the
data prior to this period does not contain all abandoned applications. Id. at 32.
77. Below, we provide a more complete list of the application characteristics that we utilize
in our empirical analysis. A certification mark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof . . . to certify regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture,
quality, accuracy, or other characteristics of such person’s good or services or that the work or
labor on the goods or services was performed by members of a union or other organization.” 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (2018). A service mark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof . . . to identify and distinguish the services of one person . . . from the services of others
and to indicate the source of the services . . . .” Id.
78. Again, for a more complete listing and discussion of the various application outcomes
that we investigate, see infra pp. 1824–26.
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2. The likelihood that the application is published on the first
substantive evaluation—that is, without an office action having
set forth an initial basis for denial of the application;
3. The likelihood that an opposition to the application was
sustained by the TTAB;
4. The likelihood that the application was ultimately registered;
and
5. The duration of the application at the Trademark Office up
until the point in time of the publication decision.
B. Methodology: Summary Statistics on Spread in Outcomes Across
Examining Attorneys
These five measures reflect outcomes of substantial import not
just to the applicants but to the members of society whose interests the
trademark system seeks to protect. In the case of each of these separate
outcomes, we begin this empirical exercise by offering simple summary
statistics describing the degree of variation in the relevant outcomes
across examining attorneys. As a baseline frame of reference, we
illustrate the mean of the relevant outcome across examiners, allowing
us to observe a central point around which we evaluate the degree of
examining-attorney heterogeneity. We then present the standard
deviation of the relevant outcome across the examining attorneys.79
Though slightly different from the “average absolute deviation” in its
precise formulation, the standard deviation tends to demonstrate the
degree to which a typical observation of the measure in question
deviates from the average value of that measure.80 Accordingly, if the
79. Importantly, when constructing these statistics and when graphically presenting the
frequency distributions of the relevant outcomes across examining attorneys, see infra Parts II.C
and II.D, we do not weigh each examiner’s relevant rate by the number of reviews that she has
completed over her lifetime. That is, in constructing the mean publication rate across examiners,
we are assigning equal weight in creating this mean to examiners who have reviewed 5,000
applications as we are to examiners who have reviewed 7,000 applications. Nonetheless, for every
empirical exercise reported in this Article, we have produced a corresponding set of results in
which we have weighted all analyses by the examiners’ lifetime review count. The conclusions
that we reach from this analysis regarding examining-attorney heterogeneity are not at all
sensitive to this weighting choice (the full set of results is available upon demand from the
authors).
80. Deviation measures are generally used to provide an average sense of how much
observations in a dataset deviate from the mean of the relevant measure within the data. An
immediate problem arises when considering that some observations will deviate in a negative
sense and some will deviate in a positive sense. Simply averaging over those positive and negative
deviations will thus mask true variations around the mean. The “standard deviation” measure
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value of the standard deviation is of a magnitude that represents a
meaningful distance from the mean, there are likely to be many
observations in the dataset that differ from one another to an
economically meaningful degree.
It is difficult to compare standard deviations across measures,
however. That is, it is arguably inappropriate to compare the standard
deviation of one measure (for example, the examining-attorney
publication rate) with the standard deviation of another measure (the
examining-attorney registration rate) if one’s goal is to assess whether
the degree of spread in the first measure is greater than or less than the
degree of spread in the second measure. For instance, one would think
there is much more spread in the data when we see a standard deviation
of 1 in a variable that has a mean of 2 than when we see a standard
deviation of 1 when looking at a variable with a mean of 100.
Accordingly, to derive a generic measure of the spread of a variable,
we next present a summary statistic that takes this point into
consideration and that scales the standard deviation in question by its
associated mean. This statistic goes by the name of the Coefficient of
Variation (“COV”). By normalizing the standard deviation in this
manner, this statistic offers a way of comparing the degree of spread
across outcomes with different means—that is, it will aid us in
comparing the magnitude of the spread in publication rates to the
magnitude of the spread in registration rates even if the mean
registration rate is notably lower than the mean publication rate.
We acknowledge, however, that reporting the COV alone does
not necessarily answer the question of whether, in an absolute sense,
there is a “large” degree of variation in the relevant measure. That
assessment perhaps remains a judgment call for the consumer of this
information depending on her priors regarding an acceptable amount
of variation. Nonetheless, in the case of the statistics reported below,
we argue that it would be reasonable to conclude from this analysis and
the degree of variation depicted that substantial administrative justice
and social welfare concerns arise in this Trademark Office context.

attempts to resolve this dilemma by squaring the deviation between each observation’s value and
the mean value across the sample, and thereafter: (1) taking the average of those squared
deviations over all observations and (2) taking the square root of this average-of-squareddeviations value to place the deviation measure back in the same units as the measure of interest.
Note that, when dealing with samples, the standard deviation divides by N-1 (instead of N) in
calculating the average squared deviation (where N equals the number of observations in the
sample). See generally HOWELL JACKSON, LOUIS KAPLOW, STEVEN SHAVELL, W. KIP VISCUSI
& DAVID COPE, ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS (3d ed. 2017).
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C. Methodology: Graphical Analysis
Perhaps the best way for us to demonstrate the full degree of
variation in these Trademark Office outcomes—and to allow the
reader to reach her own conclusions regarding the size of this
variation—is to move beyond a presentation of simple numerical
summary statistics and to visually depict the full distribution of the
relevant outcomes that we observe across the examining attorneys in
our dataset. Accordingly, we plot a frequency distribution for each
relevant measure. The x-axis of these graphs will reflect the different
possible values of the outcome in question—for instance, different
rates of trademark-application publication across examining
attorneys—and the y-axis reflects the frequency by which we observe
the respective measure across examining attorneys at each of the
relevant x-axis values. With this visualization, one can readily ascertain
the share of observed values of the outcome in question that tend to
cluster around its central tendency—such as its mean—along with the
share of these observations that extend sufficiently far from this central
point. Knowing these shares may provide a trademark applicant with a
sense of their likelihood that they may receive an outlying
determination by their assigned examiner.
Of course, one may be concerned that some degree of this
heterogeneity may not necessarily reflect true differences in how
trademark-examining attorneys actually practice but may instead
mirror variations in the characteristics of the applications assigned to
those examining attorneys. For instance, perhaps some examining
attorneys tend to get a higher concentration of intent-to-use
applications, which may tend to be published and registered at
different rates than use-based applications for reasons unrelated to the
underlying tendencies of the examining attorneys. This differential
assignment could explain some level of the variation across examiningattorney publication and registration rates. We could raise similar
concerns with respect to a range of other application characteristics.
To begin, mediating against the concern that applications of
different characteristics may be clustered in the hands of certain
examining attorneys is the random assignment of applications to
examining attorneys in the first place.
Nonetheless, to further account for any residual concerns that
these frequency distributions reflect differences in application
characteristics across the applications that examining attorneys review,
we also present corresponding frequency-distribution graphs where we
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have first adjusted each examining attorney’s rate of the respective
measure for the full set of application characteristics associated with
their reviews. In other words, we attempt to depict heterogeneity in the
examining attorney’s inherent rate of publication, inherent rate of
registration, etc., where these inherent rates have canceled out the
influence of the particular distribution of application characteristics
that the examining attorney happened to have confronted. For
instance, if an examining attorney, by happenstance, is assigned a
higher proportion of applications for trademarks associated with
pharmaceuticals and if applications in that industry just happen to be
published at higher rates relative to applications in other industries,
then our approach appropriately scales down the examining attorney’s
observed rate of publication. Specifically, to execute this approach, we
consider the sample of individual applications and regress the relevant
outcome measure—such as the incidence of publication—on the full
set of application characteristics that we wish to account for, along with
a full set of dichotomous variables representing each individual
examining attorney (that is, a full set of examining-attorney “fixed
effects”). We then use these estimated examiner fixed effects to
characterize the examining attorneys’ inherent rates of the respective
measure, a rate that partials out the influence of those other
characteristics controlled for in this regression.
For the purposes of this latter adjustment exercise, we adjust for
the following application characteristics: indicator variables for the
various years in which the applications were filed; indicator variables
for the type of mark, including trademark, service mark, collective
trademark, collective membership mark, or collective service mark;
indicator variables for the legal basis of the filing, such as whether it is
use-based,
intent-to-use,
foreign
priority/pending,
foreign
priority/published, or international registration; indicator variables for
whether the application is for a standard character mark, a mark with
stylized text, a design with or without text, or a mark for which no
drawing is possible; and indicator variables for each of the forty-five
different industry classifications, such as chemicals, clothing, etc. As we
demonstrate below, with the exception of the duration analysis, the
spread associated with the depicted frequency distributions does not
appear to be affected by this adjustment procedure. Accordingly, it
does indeed appear that random assignment of applications to
examining attorneys, combined with a large number of career reviews
for each examining attorney, goes a long way toward alleviating
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concerns over the influence of application characteristics on the
heterogeneity of raw rates of the observed measures.
D. Methodology: Statistical Inference
On a final methodological point, we acknowledge that one would
expect to observe some degree of heterogeneity in observed rates of
these various outcomes across trademark-examining attorneys just by
chance alone. Essentially, it may be correct, hypothetically, that the
true fundamental rate by which all examining attorneys publish
applications is 78 percent, in which case if examining attorneys were,
hypothetically, to review an infinite number of applications, we would
observe an average publication rate of 78 percent for each of them.
However, even if this is their fundamental tendency, we may not
observe a precise 78 percent rate for each examining attorney if we
only observe a finite number of reviews for each examiner. Due to
sampling error, we will likely observe some degree of spread in each of
the relevant outcomes across examiners. One of our key empirical
exercises is thus to test whether the degree of variation that we actually
observe is larger than one would expect from chance alone. We
approach this exercise in statistical inference from two perspectives.
First, for each of the outcome measures explored, we formally test
the null hypothesis that the rate of the relevant outcome is the same
across trademark-examining attorneys. For these purposes, we
consider the set of trademark applications and regress the relevant
outcome variable—for instance, the incidence of the application being
published—on a full set of fixed effects for each trademark-examining
attorney. We then perform an F-test of the hypothesis that each of the
estimated examining-attorney fixed effects are identical to one
another. We present the resulting F-statistic along with its
corresponding p-value, which indicates the likelihood that one would
observe the reported F-statistic if in fact the null hypothesis—that is,
equal-examiner effects—were true. If this p-value is less than 0.05, then
we can indeed reject this null hypothesis at the conventional level of
statistical confidence.
Next, we take a more graphical approach to this inference
exercise. To demonstrate this approach, consider our publication-rate
analysis and bear in mind that the average publication rate across the
sample is 78 percent. For each application, we generate a random
variable drawn from a uniform (0, 1) distribution—that is, a random
number that falls continuously between 0 and 1. With this random
draw, we generate for each application a placebo variable for whether
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or not the application was published, where this placebo equals 1—
indicating a placebo publication—if the random draw is less than 0.78
and equals 0 if the random draw is greater than 0.78. In this light, the
average rate of this placebo-publication indicator over the sample
equals the actual publication rate. Whether or not the application is
registered as a placebo publication, of course, is randomly determined.
In this light, the fundamental likelihood that we will observe a placebo
publication does not differ across examining attorneys—reflective of
our null hypothesis.
With this placebo assignment, we then calculate the rate of
placebo publications for each examining attorney in the sample and
thereafter plot a frequency distribution of these placebo-publication
rates across examiners. Naturally, we will observe some variation here,
but that variation is not a reflection of differences in inherent
publication tendencies. Instead, this placebo variation reflects mere
chance—or the likelihood that examining attorney X’s publication rate
falls above or below 78 percent because we have yet to observe enough
applications reviewed by examining attorney X to reach a convergence
around the true mean of 78 percent. Ultimately, to the extent that the
spread depicted in the frequency distribution for actual publication
rates exceeds that of the placebo-publication rates, this differential is
likely to reflect actual heterogeneity in examining-attorney behavior,
especially once adjusting for application characteristics. Although this
explanation has focused on publication rates, we perform this placebo
analysis for each of the investigated outcome variables.
Ultimately, with over 7.8 million applications in our sample and
with each examining attorney reviewing over 6,000 applications over
their careers in our sample, there is very little room in the first place
for chance alone to explain the degree of variations in outcomes across
examining attorneys that we depict in our figures. As such, we note that
there is arguably little controversy in this Article’s refutation of the
baseline null hypothesis that examining attorneys all make decisions in
the same manner. The bigger challenge for this Article is one that we
already raised above and with respect to which formal statistical tests
are arguably unavailable—namely, whether the magnitude of the
variation that we do depict is large enough to truly invoke policy
concerns. Lacking a methodological basis of assessing this arguably
subjective question, our primary methodological approach here is to
be as transparent as possible in depicting the degree of variation across
examining attorneys, allowing the readers to reach their own
assessments of whether this heterogeneity poses concerns over
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inefficiencies and inequities at the Trademark Office. Nonetheless, we
do offer for the reader our own assessments regarding the breadth of
variation observed and argue that it does implicate concerns of this
nature that merit further attention by the academy and by
policymakers.
III. RESULTS
This Part presents the results from our empirical analysis,
implementing the approaches just laid out in Part II. More specifically,
this Part provides evidence that trademark-examining attorneys have
substantially divergent overall publication rates, publication rates on
the first substantive Trademark Office action—which we use to proxy
the scope of protection allowed—and registration rates. We also find
evidence that whether a filed opposition is sustained varies
considerably among trademark-examining attorneys as does the
duration of time an application is before the Trademark Office.
A. Publication-Rate Analysis
We begin our empirical analysis by presenting evidence bearing
on heterogeneity across trademark-examining attorneys in the rates by
which they decide to publish the applications that they are reviewing.
To be clear, by rates, we are referring to the percentage of applications
reviewed by trademark-examining attorneys that they decide to
publish. As reported in Table 1, the mean publication rate across all
examining trademark attorneys, practicing since 1982, is 78 percent.
The standard deviation around this mean is 11.5 percent. This alone
suggests a meaningful degree of variation in publication decisions
across examiners, with a typical examiner’s publication rate tending to
swing from roughly 67 to 89 percent—that is, 1 standard deviation
above and below the mean. Considering that an applicant is randomly
assigned to an examiner, this “standard” spread suggests an arguably
meaningful degree of inequity in this important Trademark Office
outcome, while likewise suggesting some meaningful degree of
inefficiency in the evaluation process. As discussed below when
presenting the full distribution, the spread between the highest-rate
and lowest-rate examining attorneys is even greater.
In Table 2, we show the resulting mean and standard deviation of
the estimated examining-attorney fixed effects, which provide us with
a sense of how examining attorneys’ inherent publication rates differ
from one another while accounting for differences across examining
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attorneys in the composition of the applications that they review—for
example, accounting for differences in the mix of industries that their
reviews cover. With this adjustment process, the mean of this estimated
fixed-effect variable does not correspond with the mean overall
publication rate; rather, the mean fixed effects are centered roughly
around 0, with a positive fixed-effect value indicating that the relevant
examiner has above-average publication tendencies and a negative
value indicating below-average tendencies. Nonetheless, the standard
deviation of these estimated fixed effects continues to provide us with
a sense of the standard swing in publication rates across examining
attorneys. We find a standard deviation in estimated examiningattorney fixed effects of 11.2 percent. As demonstrated, this degree of
swing is roughly the same as we find when looking at the standard
deviation of unadjusted examining-attorney publication rates. In other
words, the degree of variation in publication rates across examining
attorneys described above cannot be explained by differences in the
types of applications reviewed by those examining attorneys. This is
perhaps not surprising given the large number of applications that they
review and given that applications are randomly assigned—that is, not
assigned to examining attorneys based on application characteristics.81
In the final row of Table 1, we formally test the null hypothesis
that the publication rate across examiners is in fact the same and that
these observed swings are merely due to sampling error. As the
reported F-statistic and associated p-value demonstrate, we can reject
this null hypothesis at a very high degree of confidence, meaning
greater than 99 percent. As such, we can infer that there are true
variations in publication rates across examining attorneys.
In Figure 1, we present a frequency distribution of the observed
publication rates across all trademark-examining attorneys from 1982
81. Note that we are comparing the degree of spread in the raw publication rates with the
degree of spread in the application-characteristic-adjusted publication rates by comparing the
standard deviations of these two measures, as distinct from comparing their COV. While
comparing spreads by comparing standard deviations is arguably inappropriate when comparing
the spreads of two separate variables, see supra Part II.B, comparing the standard deviations is
arguably appropriate here as we are comparing the degree of spread in the same inherent variable
(with the same units of measurement, etc.). The risk-adjustment approach is designed such that
the mean of the raw publication rate is the same as the mean of the predicted risk-adjusted
publication rate. When graphically depicting how this risk-adjusted publication rate varies across
examiners, we have simply recentered the mean of this distribution around 0 (since this is what is
produced through the regression-based process for risk adjustment discussed above), but this
mean recentering does not change the interpretation of the degree of spread around this mean.
In other words, shifting a distribution from side to side does not alter one’s assessment of the
degree of breadth of that distribution.
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to the present.82 This figure allows us to visualize the degree of spread
suggested by the above summary statistics while also allowing us to
observe the more extreme degree of this spread—that is, to observe
the publication rates of examining attorneys whose rates exceed 1
standard deviation away from the mean. As is evident from the figure,
a small but meaningful number of examining attorneys have
publication rates at roughly 60 percent and below and a small but
meaningful number of examining attorneys publish applications nearly
100 percent of the time. To provide more specifics on this observation
about the tails of the distribution of publication rates across examining
attorneys, the publication rate at the 2nd percentile is roughly 56
percent, whereas the publication rate at the 98th percentile is 100
percent. This suggests that at least 2 percent of trademark-examining
attorneys publish less than 56 percent of the applications that they
review, while at least 2 percent of trademark-examining attorneys
publish all of the applications that they review. In other words, if we
took fifty applicants at random, one of those applicants would draw an
examining attorney that would give them a less than 56 percent chance
of success, whereas another one of those applicants would draw an
examining attorney that would almost guarantee them success with the
publication stage of the process.
In Figure 2, we present the corresponding distribution of placebopublication rates, where we randomly assign placebo-publication
outcomes to each application such that we hit the same mean
publication rate overall and where variation across examiners can only
derive from chance and limited sample sizes. As is clear from a
comparison between Figures 1 and 2, the degree of variation in
publication rates actually observed is notably greater than what one
expects from chance alone.83
Finally, in Figure 3, we present the frequency distribution of
estimated examining-attorney fixed effects. Though now centered
around 0 as a frame of reference—by design—these estimates of

82. Again, we do not weight each examining attorney’s rate by the number of reviews that
she completes over her career, though we note that the corresponding weighted distribution looks
substantially similar to the unweighted figure, with the exception of dampening the masses at 0
and 1 when weighting these rates by the denominator.
83. As a rationality check on this placebo approach, we conducted an F-test on the null
hypothesis that each of the placebo-examining-attorney publication rates were the same. With an
F-statistic of 0.999 and a corresponding p-value of 0.500, we could not reject this null hypothesis.
Note that Figure 2 likewise does not weight the examiner’s placebo rates by the number of reviews
that they do.
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examining attorneys’ inherent publication tendencies demonstrate a
degree of spread that corresponds closely with that of the unadjusted
rates from Figure 1.
Figures 1 and 3—and the associated statistics—clearly reject the
notion of a unitary Trademark Office. However, do Figures 1 and 3
indeed imply that—at least in terms of the publication decision—there
are as many Trademark Offices as there are trademark-examining
attorneys? Not exactly. There is some degree of concentration in
behavior around the mean. In particular, there are plenty of examining
attorneys that exhibit similar behaviors. As such, it is tough to say that
each examining attorney is completely independent of one another.
However, there indeed appears to be a notable range in an applicant’s
chances of publication that depends on the random allocation of their
application to their assigned examining attorney.
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR VARIOUS OUTCOMES
ACROSS SAMPLE OF TRADEMARK-EXAMINING ATTORNEYS
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

RATE OF

DURATION

PUBLICATION
PUBLICATION
RATE (RAW)

(5)

WITHOUT ANY

REGISTRATION

REFUSAL

RATE (RAW)

ACTION

SUSTAINED- (DAYS UNTIL
OPPOSITION PUBLICATION
RATE (RAW)

DECISION,
RAW)

(RAW)

(6)
FRAME OF
REFERENCE:
PATENT
APPLICATION
GRANT RATE
(RAW)

Mean (of
Distribution of
Relevant

0.783

0.405

0.579

0.007

314.761

0.682

0.115

0.161

0.136

0.006

134.863

0.197

0.15

0.40

0.24

0.85

0.43

0.29

Examiner Rate)
Standard
Deviation (of
Distribution of
Relevant
Examiner Rate)
Coefficient of
Variation (of
Distribution of
Relevant
Examiner Rate)
F-statistic (Testing
for Equivalence of

69.115

220.656

Relevant Rates

(p-value:

(p-value:

Across

0.000)

0.000)

55.405
(p-value: 0.000)

4.363

290.067

63.19

(p-value:

(p-value:

(p-value:

0.000)

0.000)

0.000)

Examiners)

Source: Trademark Case Files Dataset (for trademark measures) and Patent Office PAIR Database (for patent
measures). Trademark data statistics are based on a sample of decisions by 1,308 trademark-examining attorneys
practicing at the Trademark Office since 1982. The reported statistics are not weighted by the number of lifetime
reviews by such examining attorneys. The examiner-level data, in turn, derives from data covering 7.8 million
trademark applications since 1982.
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR VARIOUS OUTCOMES
ACROSS SAMPLE OF TRADEMARK-EXAMINING ATTORNEYS, AFTER
ADJUSTING RELEVANT EXAMINER MEASURES FOR VARIOUS
UNDERLYING APPLICATION CHARACTERISTICS

(1)

(2)

(3)

SUSTAINED-

RATE OF
PUBLICATION

PUBLICATION

(4)

REGISTRATION

OPPOSITION

RATE

WITHOUT ANY

RATE

RATE

(ESTIMATED

REFUSAL ACTION

(ESTIMATED

(ESTIMATED

EXAMINER

(ESTIMATED

EXAMINER

EXAMINER

FIXED EFFECTS) EXAMINER FIXED FIXED EFFECTS)

FIXED

EFFECTS)

EFFECTS)

(5)
DURATION (DAYS
UNTIL PUBLICATION
DECISION,
ESTIMATED
EXAMINER FIXED
EFFECTS)

Mean (of
Distribution
of Relevant

-0.003

0.037

-0.029

0.000

-20.352

0.112

0.150

0.123

0.022

67.948

Examiner
Rate)
Standard
Deviation (of
Distribution
of Relevant
Examiner
Rate)

Source: Trademark Case Files Dataset (for trademark measures). To derive the fixed-effects measures
reported in Columns 1–5, we take an application-level dataset (covering over 7.8 million applications since
1982) and regress the relevant application-level measure—for example, the incidence of publication in the
case of Column 1—on a full set of year-fixed effects (based on the time of filing) and application
characteristics, along with a full set of examining-attorney fixed effects. The reported statistics in Table 2 are
based on the estimates of the resulting examining-attorney fixed effects across the 1,308 trademark-examining
attorneys in the sample. The reported summary statistics (for these estimated fixed effects) are not weighted
by the number of lifetime reviews by such examining attorneys.
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FIGURE 1: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLICATION RATES
(UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARK-EXAMINING ATTORNEYS

FIGURE 2: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PLACEBOPUBLICATION RATES (UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARKEXAMINING ATTORNEYS
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FIGURE 3: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED
EXAMINER FIXED EFFECTS FOR PUBLICATION RATES
(UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARK-EXAMINING
ATTORNEYS

B. Analysis of Publication Rates on First Substantive Decisions
We next explore the degree of variation across trademarkexamining attorneys in the rate by which they decide to publish
applications on the first substantive decision as opposed to deciding to
publish after a previous office action in which they had denied the
application for certain stated reasons. Again, to be clear, by this rate,
we refer to the percentage of applications reviewed by an examining
attorney that they decide to publish on the first substantive decision.
At the outset, it is important to note that this outcome arguably
merits separate attention from the above publication-rate analysis.
Consider two otherwise identical applications, one of which is
published on the first decision with no pushback by the examining
attorney and the other of which is only published after the examining
attorney issues an office action to reject on certain grounds—for
example, that the desired mark is not distinctive enough. The fact that
both otherwise identical applications are ultimately published does not
mean that both processes bring us to the same point. The scope of
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trademark protection received by the applicant whose publication
decision was rendered on the first decision is likely to be broader, an
outcome that is of relevance both to the consumers whose interests are
ultimately at stake and to the applicant’s bottom line itself.84
As demonstrated by Table 1, this first-decision-publication
outcome occurs at a notably lower rate relative to the incidence of any
publication outcome at all. Applications are published on the first
decision only 40.5 percent of the time. Interestingly, the degree to
which examining attorneys vary in this outcome is markedly greater—
in both absolute and relative terms—than the degree to which they
vary in publishing the application at all. The standard deviation in firstdecision-publication rates is 16.1 percent, suggesting that the standard
degree of swing in these rates ranges from roughly 24.5 to 56.5 percent.
The most straightforward way to compare the degree of variation in
the first-decision-publication rate and the overall publication rate is to
compare the associated COV, which, as above, normalizes the standard
deviations by the respective means to provide a relative sense of the
degree of spread involved. The COV with respect to the first-decision
outcome is over twice as large as the any-publication outcome (0.40 vs.
0.15).
As with the any-publication outcome, we can likewise easily reject
that the observed variation in first-decision-publication rates is due to
chance alone, with the p-value of the associated F-test being below
0.0001. Likewise, similar to the any-publication case, we find a nearly
identical standard deviation—15 percent—when we adjust each
examining attorney’s first-decision-publication rate for a range of
application characteristics (see Table 2).
In Figures 4–6, we replicate the pattern of frequency distributions
depicted in Figures 1–3 but now focus on the first-decision-publication
rate. We observe a wide spread in raw first-decision-publication rates
(Figure 4) that persists even when we partial out the influence of
application characteristics (Figure 6). Moreover, the degree of this
spread is strikingly larger relative to that depicted when showing the
variation in placebo first-publication decision rates (Figure 5).85 The
extremes of the possible outcomes are particularly striking. Consider
the comparison we executed above in the case of the overall

84. See Graham et al., supra note 10, at 7–9.
85. As with the any-publication analysis, we also conduct a rationality check on this placebo
analysis and test the null hypothesis that examiners’ first-decision placebo publication rates are
all the same. With a p-value of 0.19 for the associated test, we cannot reject this null hypothesis.
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publication-rate decision—that is, let us look at the distribution of
publication rates on the first decision across all examining attorneys
and compare the relevant rate at the 2nd percentile of this distribution
with the rate at the 98th percentile of this distribution. At the 2nd
percentile of this across-examining-attorney distribution, the firstpublication rate is 11 percent. At the 98th percentile, on the other hand,
it is nearly 84 percent. As such, if we took fifty applicants at random
again, one of them would be assigned to a reviewing attorney that
would provide them with a less than 11 percent chance of succeeding
on the first substantive decision, whereas another one of those
applicants will be assigned to an examining attorney that would
provide them with a greater than 84 percent chance of succeeding on
that first decision.
All told, the likelihood that an application receives a positive
publication decision on the first substantive review by the trademarkexamining attorney depends heavily upon the examining attorney to
whom the applicant is randomly assigned.
FIGURE 4: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF FIRST-DECISION
PUBLICATION RATES (UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARKEXAMINING ATTORNEYS
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FIGURE 5: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PLACEBO FIRSTDECISION PUBLICATION RATES (UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS
TRADEMARK-EXAMINING ATTORNEYS

FIGURE 6: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED
EXAMINER FIXED EFFECTS FOR FIRST-DECISION PUBLICATION
RATES (UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARK-EXAMINING
ATTORNEYS
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C. Registration-Rate Analysis
The rate by which trademark-examining attorneys’ underlying
applications are ultimately registered—again, as a fraction of
applications reviewed—likewise varies notably across examiners. This
variation was slightly higher relative to the variation in publication
rates, with a COV of 0.24 in registration rates in comparison with the
COV of 0.15 in the publication-rate context. But it was less so relative
to the variation in first-decision publication decisions, where the COV
was 0.40. The average publication rate across our sample of trademark
applications is roughly 58 percent, with a standard deviation of 13.6
percent around this mean. Accordingly, the standard degree of
publication-rate swing ranges from roughly 46 to 72 percent. As
demonstrated by the frequency distribution depicted in Figure 7, the
range of publication rates is even larger when considering the outliers
on both ends of the distribution. Although the vast bulk of examining
attorneys are associated with registration rates spanning from 40 to 80
percent, the distribution does span from a small but meaningful mass
at 0 all the way up to 100 percent.
Consistent with the above analyses, this spread also cannot be
explained by variations in the composition of applications reviewed
across examiners, as demonstrated by the frequency distribution of
estimated examining-attorney fixed effects for registration rates
depicted in Figure 9, whose standard deviation is slightly smaller but
not meaningfully smaller than that of the distribution of raw
registration rates.
Further, we confirm that these variations are indeed real and not
the product of sampling error, with a p-value of less than 0.000
indicating a high degree of confidence in rejecting the null hypothesis
of no variation in registration rates across examining attorneys.
Graphically reinforcing this inference, we also find that the actual
degree of spread in registration rates across examiners depicted in
Figure 7 is notably wider than the spread in placebo registration rates
depicted in Figure 8.86

86. As with the publication-rate outcomes, we also conduct a rationality check in which we
fail to reject the hypothesis that these placebo registration rates are equal across examining
attorneys.
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FIGURE 7: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF REGISTRATION
RATES (UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARK-EXAMINING
ATTORNEYS

FIGURE 8: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PLACEBO
REGISTRATION RATES (UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARKEXAMINING ATTORNEYS
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FIGURE 9: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED
EXAMINER FIXED EFFECTS FOR REGISTRATION RATES
(UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARK-EXAMINING
ATTORNEYS

D. Sustained-Opposition-Rate Analysis
We next turn to an evaluation of an outcome that is not necessarily
a specific decision made by the trademark-examining attorney but that
is arguably a reflection of the quality of work completed by the
trademark-examining attorney. For these purposes, we consider the
likelihood that the underlying application ultimately leads to a thirdparty opposition that is sustained by the TTAB. We calculate this
sustained-opposition rate using the number of sustained oppositions
associated with an examining attorney’s reviews as the numerator and
all of the applications reviewed by the examining attorney as the
denominator.87

87. Although it would indeed be an interesting exercise, we leave it for future analysis to
consider variation in sustained-opposition rates across applications conditional on the level of
publication rates of the associated examining attorney. For instance, conditional on the
applications gained approval from a lenient examining attorney, what is the distribution of
sustained-opposition rates across applications? To some extent this might provide interesting
insights into the nature of the TTAB. Our goal in this Article, however, is to explore variability
across trademark-examining attorneys. As such, to calculate an opposition rate specific to an
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One important difference between the distribution of sustainedopposition rates and the above distributions is that the rates of
sustained oppositions are much lower, with a very meaningful mass at
0. Nonetheless, despite this left censoring at 0 and this overall notably
lower mean, we continue to document arguably significant variation
relative to this mean. As demonstrated in Table 1, the average
likelihood that an application is associated with a sustained opposition
by TTAB is roughly 0.7 percent. That is, roughly 7 out of 1000
applications reviewed by an average examiner are associated with a
sustained opposition by TTAB. We find a standard deviation of
roughly 0.6 percent around this mean, in which case we find a roughly
0.85 COV with respect to this measure. This COV is notably higher
than the degree of variation, relatively speaking, associated with the
publication and registration outcomes.
Figure 10 allows us to visualize this variation across examining
attorneys. The large mass at 0 is evident from this figure, with roughly
10 percent of trademark-examining attorneys not being associated with
sustained oppositions. To provide a better sense of the right tail of this
distribution, consider the examiner in the 98th percentile of the
distribution of sustained-opposition rates across examining attorneys.
Although the mean examining attorney is associated with roughly 7 out
of 1000 applications receiving a sustained opposition, the examiner in
the 98th percentile has a sustained opposition rate roughly three times
that level, with roughly 22 out of 1000 applications receiving a
sustained opposition.
Interestingly, as can be visualized by the fixed-effects frequency
distribution depicted in Figure 12 and by the reported standard
deviation in Table 2 in comparison with Table 1, we actually find a
wider degree of variation in this outcome when adjusting examining
attorneys’ rates for the full set of observable application characteristics.
Finally, we note that the F-test results suggest that we can easily
reject the null hypothesis of equal sustained-opposition rates across
examining attorneys, with a p-value of less than 0.000. Likewise, the
degree of variation in actual and adjusted rates that we observe are
greater than that observed of placebo sustained-opposition rates across
examining attorneys (Figure 11), though arguably the difference

examining attorney reflective of variability in this outcome across examining attorneys, it is
natural to normalize this outcome by the reviews completed by that attorney.
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between actual and placebo variation appears smaller in this case
relative to the publication- and registration-rate outcomes.88
FIGURE 10: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF SUSTAINEDOPPOSITION RATES (UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARKEXAMINING ATTORNEYS

88. As with the above outcomes, we also conduct a rationality check in which we fail to reject
the hypothesis that these placebo sustained-opposition rates are equal across examining
attorneys.
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FIGURE 11: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PLACEBO
SUSTAINED-OPPOSITION RATES (UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS
TRADEMARK-EXAMINING ATTORNEYS

FIGURE 12: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED
EXAMINER FIXED EFFECTS FOR SUSTAINED-OPPOSITION
RATES (UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARK-EXAMINING
ATTORNEYS
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E. Application-Duration Analysis
In our final empirical exercise, we explore a measure of processing
efficiency. Specifically, we explore heterogeneity in the length of time
in days it takes trademark-examining attorneys to reach a publication
decision. For those applications that get published, this represents the
length of time between the date of filing and the date of publication.
For those applications that were not published, this represents the
length of time between the date of filing and the date of abandonment
of the application. We focus on the publication-rate duration rather
than the length of time between filing and the date of registration given
that examining attorneys arguably have greater control over the former
and given the substantial impacts that application type—that is, use
versus intent-to-use—have on the length of time between publication
and registration.
We find that, on average, it takes roughly 315 days to reach this
publication decision, with a standard deviation around this mean of
roughly 135 days (see Table 1). With a resulting COV of 0.43, this
degree of heterogeneity is even greater than that associated with the
publication rates and registration rates themselves. However, this
duration outcome represents the one outcome in which we find that
adjusting examining attorneys’ durations for the observation
characteristics of the applications they review leads to a decent
narrowing of this spread—much of this is due to controlling for the year
in which the application is reviewed. We find that the standard
deviation falls by roughly half when instead looking at the estimated
examiner fixed effects for this measure (see Table 2). Even in this
instance, however, we continue to observe a substantial degree of
variation across trademark-examining attorneys in publication
durations, with a standard degree of swing around the mean inherentduration length of over two months. This conclusion is reinforced by
observing the full distribution of raw and adjusted publication-decision
durations, as depicted in Figures 13 and 15.
In Figure 14, we present the distribution of placebo publicationdecision durations across examining attorneys. The degree of actual
variation considerably exceeds the degree of this placebo variation in
publication-decision durations, bolstering the inference that examiners
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vary considerably in their review durations.89 The results of the
associated F-test only reinforce this conclusion (see Table 1).
FIGURE 13: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLICATION-DECISION
DURATION (IN DAYS, UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARKEXAMINING ATTORNEYS

89. To generate a placebo duration, we assign each application a random placebo value
drawn from a normal distribution with a mean of 315 and a standard deviation of 135—that is, the
mean and standard deviation from the actual empirical distribution of durations from our data.
As with the other outcomes, we also conduct a rationality check in which we fail to reject the
hypothesis that these placebo duration values are equal across examining attorneys.
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FIGURE 14: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PLACEBO
PUBLICATION-DECISION DURATION (IN DAYS, UNWEIGHTED)
ACROSS TRADEMARK-EXAMINING ATTORNEYS

FIGURE 15: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED
EXAMINER FIXED EFFECTS FOR PUBLICATION-DECISION
DURATION (IN DAYS, UNWEIGHTED) ACROSS TRADEMARKEXAMINING ATTORNEYS
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IV. IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSION
The above empirical analysis raises clear concerns over the
inequities of the administrative process by demonstrating that the
examining attorney to which applicants are randomly assigned may
have a substantial bearing on their likelihood of being published; their
likelihood of being registered; the scope of any ultimate protection
received (as proxied by an allowance for publication on the first
substantive decision); their likelihood of having a third party
successfully oppose their application; and the speed by which they
receive a decision by the Trademark Office. Again, to use the example
from above, if one took fifty trademark applicants at random, one of
them would receive an examining attorney offering a chance of success
at the publication stage as low at 56 percent, whereas another one of
those fifty applicants would receive a chance of success as high as 100
percent based on her assigned examining attorney. This disparity is
striking considering that the publication-rate distribution is the tightest
of those that we depict. The spreads in the other outcomes that we
explore—in relative, unit-free terms—are even greater. This degree of
substantial variation in outcomes across trademark-examining
attorneys remains true even after accounting for a rich degree of
application characteristics that may also impact these outcomes.
Considering that the registrability criteria are meant to track the
economic justifications for trademark protection, one might assume
that, conditional on the relevant application parameters, there exists
an ideal social welfare maximizing manner of applying these criteria.
Yet the fact that we observe such notable variations in important
Trademark Office outcomes across examining attorneys suggests that
the Trademark Office may be erring considerably—perhaps on either
side—in attaining any such ideal. In turn, the consequences may
involve considerable social welfare losses.
Of course, heterogeneity is not necessarily problematic from a
social welfare perspective to the extent that it reflects experimentation
across the examining corps—that is, an attempt to uncover what this
ideal decision-making process looks like. However, if one thought that
the variation that we observed represents beneficial degrees of
experimentation, then one would expect that we would nonetheless
begin to observe convergence over time as examining attorneys learn
from prior experimentation and begin to coalesce around optimal
practices. Unfortunately, we do not find robust markers suggestive of
any such convergence. Consider, for instance, the publication decision.
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The COV in publication rates across examiners is just as high in the
2010s as it was in the 1980s.
To be clear, rampant variations in outcomes across randomly
assigned examining attorneys implicate more than just concerns over
economic efficiency. They also raise apprehensions over the
distribution of resources across applicants, along with concerns over
administrative justice.
Ultimately, given that heterogeneity in trademark-examiningattorney behaviors threatens both equity and social welfare, it is
important for future research in this area to identify the sources of such
heterogeneity. With such information in hand, either the Trademark
Office or Congress can be in a position to adopt personnel, training,
supervising, and related policies to reduce these disparities while at the
same time converging practices around the social welfare maximizing
approaches.
The patent side of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has
arguably received more attention on such matters. Professors Iain
Cockburn, Samuel Kortum, and Scott Stern’s noteworthy article
demonstrated similar concerns in the patent context.90 Their analysis
inspired us to conduct a series of studies to unpack the determinants of
patent-examiner grant rates and the variation in such rates across
examiners, among other Patent Office outcomes. Through this series
of studies, we have found that key determinants of patent-examiner
behavior include (1) the fee structure of the agency, which creates
grant incentives that vary across technologies and applicant types;91 (2)
the availability of repeat-filing mechanisms, which likewise creates
grant incentives that vary across technologies;92 (3) the amount of time
extended to patent examiners, which varies across technology and
examiner General-Schedule pay level along with the experience level
of the examiner;93 (4) the patent examiner’s hiring-year cohort, which
90. See Iain M. Cockburn, Samuel Kortum & Scott Stern, Are All Patent Examiners Equal?
Examiners, Patent Characteristics, and Litigation Outcomes, in Patents in the Knowledge-Based
Economy 19, 28 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003).
91. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect
Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV.
67, 70, 96 (2013).
92. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 617
(2015).
93. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent
Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Microlevel Application
Data, 99 REV. ECON. & STAT. 550, 550–51 (2017).
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may be strongly influenced by the agency-driven culture under which
they were trained—a culture that is known to vary considerably over
time within the Patent Office;94 and (5) patent examiners’ peer
groups.95
Though Cockburn, Kortum, and Stern did not consider the patentapplication grant rate among their outcomes of consideration, we
demonstrate in Table 1 of this Article that patent-application grant
rates do vary considerably across patent examiners, with a COV of
0.29, which roughly corresponds with the degree of variation
documented in the trademark context. In light of the equitable and
welfare harms that may stem from disparities in trademark-examiningattorney decision-making, it is time for the Trademark Office to get as
much attention in such matters as has been received by the Patent
Office, both by policymakers and by researchers interested in
uncovering the causes of such disparities.
CONCLUSION
This Article conducts the first large-scale examination of
trademark-examining-attorney decision-making. We find meaningful
variation in trademark examiners’ registration rates, first-substantivereview publication rates, overall publication rates, and sustainedopposition rates at TTAB, along with meaningful variation in the speed
by which the examining attorney provides a final decision. These
differences hold even after accounting for a rich degree of application
characteristics that may also impact these outcomes. Such differences
in trademark-examining-attorney determinations raise concerns
regarding equity and social welfare. Future research is needed to
determine the causes of the heterogeneity documented in this Article
and provide the Trademark Office with guidance as to how to bring
more homogeneity to trademark-examiner decisions.

94. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Patent Office Cohorts, 65 DUKE L.J. 1601,
1605 (2016).
95. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Knowledge Spillovers and Learning in the
Workplace: Evidence from the U.S. Patent Office 6–7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 24159, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24159.pdf [https://perma.cc/97AFCAQU].

